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Abstract: This paper describes the development of security requirements for non-
political Internet voting. The practical background is our experience with the 
Internet voting within the Gesellschaft für Informatik (GI – Informatics Society) 
2004 and 2005. The theoretical background is the international state-of-the-art of 
requirements about electronic voting, especially in Europe and in the US. A focus 
of this paper is on the user community driven standardization of security 
requirements by means of a Protection Profile of the international Common 
Criteria standard. An extended version of this article (20 pages) is published as 
technical report by the University in Koblenz (see reference list). 
1 The GI and its election 2004 
The Gesellschaft für Informatik (GI) is a society for computer science with presently 
about 24.000 members mainly from Germany. The rules for elections of the bodies of 
the GI are formally specified by the GI [GI03; GI04]. Since July 2003, the article 3.5.4 
of the constitution of the GI allows the application of Internet voting. Here the 
precondition is that the Internet voting system provides the same security level as postal 
voting. In all cases where postal voting is admitted the election committee can decide to 
give members also the possibility to use an Internet voting system – as long as it is 
comparably secure. In summer 2004, the chairmanship (Präsidium) decided unanimously 
to offer both, postal voting and Internet voting for the chairmanship elections in 
December 2004. The election was successful. As a consequence the persons in charge 
decided to apply Internet voting again in 2005 for the election of the chairmanship and 
of the executive board of the GI. Until now the GI has voted online twice and plans to do 
so again in 2006. 
After a market survey the GI chairpersons decided to use the POLYAS system [MM05] 
for Internet voting. The POLYAS system provides two authorization schemes, one based 
on authentication with digital signatures, the other employs PINs and user-ids instead. 
For better usability and simplicity, election PINs and personal user-ids were chosen for 
the GI election. Every GI member received a paper letter with the information material 
how to use the Internet voting system. In particular, the letter informed the member, that 
the user-id is the GI membership number. The PIN was printed on the letter and 
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concealed by an opaque (not transparent) sticker on the letter. The user-id and election 
PIN was used for registration. Finally, the letter specified the URL for the Internet voting 
system. Every voter who did not want to cast her vote electronically could alternatively 
participate by using postal voting. 
The GI established a group of security experts to accompany the election and the future 
process of Internet voting in the GI. This group examined the specification and the 
documentation of the system, in particular with regard to data protection and 
manipulations. A main task of the expert group was to develop and enforce ad-hoc 
security requirements in cooperation with Micromata. 
Micromata has done some minor changes on POLYAS to comply with the security 
requirements. Most security requirements could be met by organisational means. On a 
technical level, the following features were implemented 
? audit proof archiving of the ballots preventing later manipulation of votes; 
? separation of the electoral register from the ballot box; in particular, any shared 
marks were removed; 
? SHA-signatures of software packages and result files. 
Over 5000 members used the Internet voting system. The participation was significantly 
better than in several years before. 
2 GI election 2005 – restructuring the security requirements 
In December 2004, the Internet voting expert group of the GI decided to develop a 
requirements catalogue for „Internet-based elections in societies”. They agreed on two 
preconditions. Firstly, the security requirements must ensure a security level not less 
than that of postal voting. Secondly, the catalogue should be short and crisp and should 
not exceed six printed pages. Four requirements catalogues were already available and 
could be used as a basis for further development: [CoE04; SCC04; PTB04]. After 
several iterations, a last version was published in [GI05].  
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The catalogue starts off with some preliminary notes and explicates assumptions under 
which any applied Internet voting system must ensure the security requirements. For 
example, it is assumed that the voter casts her ballot from an arbitrary Internet device 
connected to the Internet. Other assumptions are these: A non-secret name or a 
membership number (user-id) is applied for the voter identification. A secret 
alphanumeric password (one-time election PIN) is used for the voter authentication. The 
electronic ballot box and the electronic election register are installed on different servers. 
The two servers are located in different organisations. Postal voting is possible for every 
voter who does not want to cast an electronic ballot. The preliminary notes also define 
issues which are out-of-scope of the security requirements catalogue. For example, the 
candidate nomination and the maintenance of the list of eligible voters are not 
considered in the catalogue. Rules for a long-time storage of the election results are not 
addressed, either. 
The catalogue of 2005 separates the requirements on the system development and on the 
election execution from those requirements on the Internet voting system itself. The 
requirements on the voting system itself are divided in requirements on the election 
servers and on the election software.  
The general requirements on the system development contain requirements on the type 
and level of details of the system description, the security analysis and the manuals. 
There are especially strong requirements on the anonymity concepts. This category 
includes requirements on the development process, the system tests and the key 
management. The requirements on the election execution contain the distribution of the 
election PIN, the election register management and the installation as well as the de-
installation of the voting system. The catalogue requires for the election servers to run a 
secure operating system, and to isolate the election software from all other applications. 
Only authorized persons may have access to the servers. 
For the requirements on the election software the following categories were used. 
? General requirements to an Internet voting system and its security 
? Specific functional requirements to the Internet voting system 
? Requirements with respect to the anonymity of votes 
? Specific requirements to ensure a universal and equal election 
? Ergonomic and usability requirements 
The general functional requirements include the systems reliability and logging as well 
as the guarantee of consistent system states in case of any interruption. Specific 
functional requirements refer to the electronic register and to the electronic ballot box. 
Requirements with respect to the anonymity specify a secret, equal and universal 
election. The last category of requirements on the election software addresses 
ergonomics and usability. 
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3 GI election 2005 – meeting the requirements 
On the basis of this agreed catalogue of requirements, Micromata was requested to 
explain how the POLYAS system ensures each of the requirements. Micromata has 
developed a new major release called POLYAS 2005 complying with the new catalogue 
of requirements. The main issues were: 
? separation of the two servers, the ballot box and the election register; 
? creation of a third server instance called the validator: the validator signs every 
entry of the electoral register before the elections starts; during the voting 
process the validator checks this signature of every voter from the register 
before it enables the voter to cast his ballot; 
? system recovery, e. g. after system errors or client aborts during the election; 
? detection of manipulations without violating the confidentiality of the ballots; 
? several mechanisms to minimize possible system attacks by both, external 
Internet users and internal corrupted administrators: e.g. a check sum of each 
vote, the storage of votes as readable text and not as a database reference, 
splitting up the keys in a passphrase and a secret key to support the four-eyes-
principle, firewalls and a „secure” operating system. 
? documentation of all technical and organisational solutions to accomplish the 
security requirements; 
? anonymous creation of the voters’ PINs for the print service provider. 
The technical solutions concerning error handling, recovery mechanisms, manipulation 
and threat scenarios were documented in detail. Organisational security solutions are 
based on the four-eyes–principle. At least two different persons must cooperate for 
administration of the systems, for starting the election application etc. The roles and 
responsibilities of the actors (management, administrators, voters, service providers etc.) 
are clearly specified in the documentation. 
By applying the POLYAS system to the requirements catalogues we found out that 
several terms were used inconsistently. Thus, we developed a glossary including the 
terms election voting system, election voting software, ballot box, ballot box server, and 
authentication token. 
Workshops in Kassel (home of Micromata) and Munich (home of one of the GI board 
members) revealed four new challenges: 
1. Source code inspection: In order to increase trust in the decency of the software, and 
especially in order to identify undetected errors, Micromata and the GI expert group 
invited external experts to inspect the code of the POLYAS system. The inspection was 
not formal. Different experts of the GI community and of the Physikalisch-Technische 
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Bundesanstalt (PTB) inspected parts of the code on their own choice and on the 
background of their personal engineering experience. The code proved to be well 
structured. However, a set of improvements were initiated. 
2. A simplified voters’ guide [GIFS05]: The GI expert group specified a set of guidelines 
for online voters, which contains one page of general hints and thirteen easy-to-follow 
one-sentence rules for voters. The guidelines do not provide the illusion of a 100 percent 
secure client (which does not exist), but helps users to better assess their security level 
and to improve it on their own responsibility. 
3. CC standardization of the requirements catalogue: In order to standardize the findings 
on security requirements the Common Criteria (CC) is the suitable framework. The GI 
expert group founded a sub-group to specify a CC protection profile for the security 
requirements of Internet voting for private societies and other non-governmental 
organisations. The GI would be one application field of the protection profile. This issue 
is discussed in chapters 5 and 6 of this paper in more detail. 
4. A suitable comparison of Internet voting with postal voting: Despite the regulation of 
the GI elections that the security of Internet voting must be at least on the level of postal 
voting, these two voting methods cannot be compared in every respect. There are pros 
and cons with both systems, and in some respect, Internet voting is even much more 
secure than postal voting. For example an Internet voting system has the possibility to 
send an acknowledgement to the voter which informs the voter that her ballot has been 
stored. With postal voting the voter cannot know exactly if or if not her ballot arrives at 
the electoral office in time or if it arrives at all. The enforcement of anonymity is another 
advantage of Internet voting. Electronic ballots can be encrypted safely. Within postal 
voting, in contrast, it is much easier to open the well marked election letters. For a 
deeper discussion of this issue see [KrVo05]. 
4 The future of GI elections 
The GI elections 2005 were a success, too. The participation was kept on the same 
improved level as 2004. There were no serious security attacks. 
One problem was that the stickers on the paper letters were not as opaque as they should 
have been: very strong light was able to make the covered PINs visible. This is not a 
problem of the electronic system, but of the organizational implementation of the 
system. Another general problem is that a voting system must be able to handle 
differences between the number of voters that are registered as having voted and the 
number of votes in the ballot box. This may happen when messages between the servers 
get lost. The Polyas system offers protocol security mechanisms to detect such 
inconsistencies and fix them dynamically. 
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Plans for the next major release 2006 are: 
? further improvement of the Internet voting protocol for a better system recovery 
after system failures;  
? as an extension of the four-eyes-principle: implementation of an m-n threshold 
scheme for key distribution; 
? support of EML (election markup language) for an easier configuration 
management; 
? modified modules will help local chairs of GI subsections to administer their 
own elections. 
Long term plans include the implementation of a rich voting client using bulletin board 
systems technologies. Rich voting clients allow for the implementation of security 
anchors in the hand of the voters. 
As a consequence from this encouraging experience, the GI will continue to offer 
Internet voting to its members. Especially for the departments and working groups of the 
GI, Internet voting will be cheap, safe, and easy, and it will include much more members 
to execute their democratic right to elect their chairpersons. 
5 International and European standards for e-voting 
Discussions about the security of e-voting systems have often been led in a very 
emotional way. Following the falsification principle of Karl Popper the security of an e-
voting system can never be proved but only perceived secure until proven otherwise. 
This, and the fact that anonymity in electronic processes is not an easy task, has led to 
numerous reports about erroneous and fraudulent e-voting systems. In order to reach 
confidence of the voters, developers and election operators have soon started to develop 
requirement documents which have often emerged to real standards. Note that electronic 
voting comprises the usage of voting machines and remote e-voting systems. 
Germany was one of the first to have legal regulations concerning the use and testing of 
mechanical voting machines. The „Regulation of voting machines” [DE75; DE99] was 
set into place as a law on voting machines in 1975 and was changed in 1999 to allow for 
electronic voting machines. Currently only e-voting machines built by Nedap have 
passed the official tests by the German test authority PTB. These machines had been in 
discussion in Ireland for the national elections 2004. They are in use in several locations 
all over Germany. In the United States the use of voting machines is decided on a district 
level which makes national standards on those machines hard to push. Still the IEEE 
made an effort with the „Project 1583” [IEEE05] to develop such a standard in the 
aftermath of the 2000 Florida experiences. After a controversial debate about the draft 
standard, it finally was turned down and the working group is still trying to deliberate on 
the controversial issues. 
208
- 209 - 
For remote electronic voting one of the first discussions around requirements was the 
working group set up by US President Clinton in 2000 [IPI01]. It took place during the 
Arizona Primaries which was the first political election to feature e-voting for 
participation by the general public. The report of this working group defined a number of 
quality criteria for remote e-voting software to be met for a successful usage. In the 
succession of the Arizona experiment another project evolved: the election mark-up 
language standard. This has been developed by companies engaged in e-voting under the 
umbrella of the standardization organisation [EML05]. In Germany the national 
metrology institute PTB developed a criteria catalogue for networked polling stations in 
order to support the W.I.E.N. project. [PTB 04]. It uses a similar methodology like the 
one used for voting machines. This catalogue may serve as a basis for evaluation of 
Internet voting systems in Germany. 
The largest effort to come to a common understanding by a set of criteria for both, 
remote electronic voting and voting machines, has been conducted by the Council of 
Europe [CoE04]. With the help of delegates from all 48 member states it has developed a 
set of legal, operational and technical standards on electronic voting. It is the most 
comprehensive and universal standard to date. 
There are even many more collections of requirements with different foci. Nevertheless 
hardly any of the e-voting systems have ever been checked with reference to an 
international standard. The perceived security of the systems is most often based on 
some kind of an independent audit by experts. This lack of transparency can only be 
improved by proper documentation in the framework of an internationally accepted 
standard. 
6 The CC approach of protection profiles 
The Common Criteria (CC) is an international standard (ISO 15408) for computer 
security. The official name is „The Common Criteria for Information Technology 
Security Evaluation”. Its purpose is to allow users to specify their security requirements, 
to allow developers to specify the security attributes of their products, and to allow 
evaluators to determine if products actually meet their claims. Thus, the CC 
distinguishes three groups: the customer, the developer and the evaluator. Independent of 
these three groups a certification authority certifies the related statements. 
The Common Criteria results from a standardization of national security criteria from 
different sources, starting with the „Orange Book” of the US DoD 1985. The criteria are 
improved continually. At the moment the official Common Criteria version is the 
version V2.3. Today many nations (e.g. Germany, France, UK) have introduced the 
Common Criteria to define and certify IT security products and procedures. There is a 
growing list of nations which at least accept the CC-certificates (e.g. Spain, Greece, 
Italy). 
The CC contains three parts: the Introduction and Common Model (part 1), the Security 
Functional Requirements (part 2), and the Security Assurance Requirements (part 3): 
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There is also a related document, the „Common Evaluation Methodology“ (CEM). The 
CEM guides an evaluator in applying the CC. They convert the assurance requirements 
of the CC to concret verification tasks. The CC defines two most important document 
types: the Protection Profile document (PP), and the Security Target document (ST). 
A PP is a set of security requirements for a category of possible products, so-called 
Targets of Evaluation (TOE) that meet specific consumer needs. The requirements are 
independent of technical solutions, that is, PPs leave the technical implementation open. 
A PP distinguishes between security functional requirements and security assurance 
requirements, described in a very specific (semiformal) way defined by the CC. In 
addition there is a description part which describes the security concepts and the threats. 
In particular the description part maps requirements to the threats. 
An ST document is to be created by a system developer, who identifies the security 
capabilities of his/her particular product. An ST may claim to implement zero or more 
PPs. 
Both PPs and STs can go through a formal evaluation. The evaluation is done by an 
accredited laboratory. An evaluation of a Protection Profile is a pure document check. It 
simply ensures that the PP meets various syntactical and documentation rules as well as 
sanity checks. Therefore the evaluator has to check whether the set of requirements is 
exhaustive and self-contained. Successfully evaluated PPs are accredited by the German 
Federal Office of Information Security (BSI). Certificates for protection profiles are 
recognized and published internationally on the Common Criteria Portal. 
A Security Target, in contrast, compares a concrete product with an ST document. The 
purpose of an ST evaluation is to ensure that the actual product (the TOE) meets the 
security functional requirements described in the Security Target. An ST can be based on 
one or more Protection Profiles if all included PPs are evaluated and if they have 
received a certificate of compliance. The evaluation insensitivity of the related TOE 
depends on the Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL), fixed as a minimum level in the ST 
or PP. The CCs predefine seven test depths (EALs) whereby Level 1 is the lowest and 
Level 7 the highest level. Level 4 is the highest level for typical commercial products 
and includes the source code evaluation. From level 5 and higher we need more and 
more formal specification documents. 
A Protection Profile contains seven main parts: the Introduction, the TOE Description, 
the Security Environment, the Security Objectives, the Security Requirements, the 
Application Notes and the Rationales. A PP starts with the introduction part which 
contains document management and overview information. This part should help a 
potential user of the PP to determine whether the PP is of interest or not. The TOE 
description provides context for the evaluation to improve the understanding of the 
security requirements. The statement of TOE security environment shall describe the 
security aspects of the environment in which the TOE is intended to be used and the 
manner in which it is expected to be employed, i.e. assumptions about the environment, 
threats, and organisational security policies OSP (the OSP cover all regulations or laws 
which have to be supported by the TOE) . The statement of security objectives are 
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deduced from the security environment. The security requirements part of the PP defines 
the detailed IT security requirements to be satisfied by the TOE or its environment. The 
security requirements are the text blocks predefined in the CC-catalogue. The application 
notes are optional. They may contain additional supporting information about the 
construction, evaluation, or use of the TOE. The rationales part of the PP presents the 
evidence used in the PP evaluation. This evidence supports the claims that the PP is a 
complete and cohesive set of requirements and that a conformant TOE would provide an 
effective set of IT security countermeasures within the security environment. This is a 
self check chapter for the PP editor. 
The CC is a tool to build standard documents. The evaluated and certificated Protection 
Profiles are registered, available and accepted on an international level. The PP concept 
offers the customers the possibility to define their security requirements and standards 
for products. Thus, product developers are able to implement products that meet the 
customers’ needs. 
7 Summary and Conclusions 
Internet voting has to guarantee the anonymity of voters and the authenticity of their 
votes. These two security requirements seem to be contradictory, but in fact they are not. 
Early solutions by homomorphic cryptographic functions or blind signatures have 
fascinated the academic community. However, related solutions were not accepted by a 
broad user community. Therefore, the German „Gesellschaft für Informatik” (GI) has 
decided to learn from earlier experiences and to try out a simpler version of Internet 
voting. In order to make this project serious, the GI – together with a professional system 
provider – developed an existing solution further and performed two elections 
electronically with the system while it was developed. 
Besides other measures to improve security and transparency like source code inspection 
and usage guidelines, a set of security requirements was formulated and refined by 
public and expert discussion. Voting principles are basically the same in all democratic 
societies of the world. Therefore, it makes sense to formulate the security requirements 
in a way that the international community can share the experience and take influence. A 
standardized way of security requirements created by a user community is given by the 
instrument of a Protection Profile of the Common Criteria [ISO99]. 
We have initiated a working group to work on such a Protection Profile. Realistic 
applications are groups which have a need for decisions but do not often meet 
physically. Examples in the academic community are IFIP technical committees and 
working groups, IETF and W3C committees, and distributed project teams. In the 
economic life staff and workers councils and shareholder groups could profit from 
Internet voting. We expect a first published version of a Protection Profile for non-
political Internet voting by late summer 2006. 
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